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99 N.C. L. REV. 821 (2021)

Pleading for Justice: An Analysis of Pleading Sufficiency and Class
Action Certification as Applied to Vulnerable Populations in Willis v.
City of Seattle *
Unhoused individuals are one of the most vulnerable populations in the United
States. Yet, frequently, state and local governments have seized and destroyed
their property with impunity during “sweeps” of encampments where those
individuals seek shelter. The plaintiffs in Willis v. City of Seattle were victims
of such cruelty. In an attempt to stop the unconstitutional sweeps, they brought
a class action lawsuit. However, the Ninth Circuit tossed out their case for
procedural reasons before the merits could ever be discussed. In its majority
opinion, the court couched its callousness toward the plight of the plaintiffs in the
complexities of civil procedure.
Class action lawsuits, like the one in Willis, are often the only way that
unhoused individuals can effectively protect their constitutional rights from
rampant violations. Accordingly, when the courthouse doors are closed to these
individuals, as in Willis, so too is any hope of obtaining justice.
This Recent Development analyzes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at issue
in Willis in light of the Supreme Court’s rulings in cases such as Ashcroft v.
Iqbal and Wal-Mart v. Dukes and ultimately argues that the plaintiffs pled a
sufficient facial challenge to the defendants’ sweep policies and should have been
certified as a class. In erroneously failing to certify the plaintiffs in Willis as a
class, the Ninth Circuit misapplied clear precedent and procedural rules, ignored
the seriousness (and similarity) of the plaintiffs’ constitutional injury, and
enabled the continued victimization of one of the most vulnerable populations
in the United States: unhoused individuals.
INTRODUCTION
Your life did not turn out the way you planned, or perhaps this is the life
you have always known. No matter where you look, you cannot find an
affordable place to live. 1 Sometimes you can find space at one of the local
* © 2021 Heather Helmendach.
1. This is disproportionately true for unhoused individuals with a mental disability. See Project
Homeless team, Three Years into a State of Emergency, What We’ve Learned About Homelessness, SEATTLE
TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/homeless/three-years-into-a-state-of-emergencywhat-weve-learned-about-homelessness/ [https://perma.cc/C6XA-AU54] (Nov. 3, 2018, 8:49 PM)
(“Nearly half of King County’s homeless people said they had a mental-health problem that hindered
their getting housing, holding a job or taking care of themselves.”).
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shelters, but you are usually turned away with countless others. 2 You take what
few possessions you have and decide that your best option is to live in one of
the local encampments. Before you leave the encampment one day—perhaps to
get groceries, search for work, or attend school 3—the woman in the tent nearest
yours warns you not to leave your possessions behind. In response to your
puzzled look, she tells you about the City and their “sweeps.” She says you
never know when they are coming, but they take everything you have and
usually just throw it away. 4 She shakes her head, then tells you what the City
has seized or destroyed: medication, medical devices, blankets, sleeping bags,
clothing, tents, tarps, cookware, food, identification, and family heirlooms. 5
Shocked, you ask why the City is allowed to treat its citizens that way and why
nothing has been done. She tells you that a few years ago, some attorneys tried
to stop the City from conducting the sweeps, but the court tossed out the case.
She sighs and says that she thought they might have stood a chance if enough
people joined the lawsuit. But now it is over, and no one has the resources to
go up against the City alone. Assuming that one of the encampment members
had the extra time and money to sue, it would be almost impossible for them to
keep up with any documents or other communications for the suit; it would all
be thrown away in the sweeps along with everything else. 6 She lowers her voice
and says that even if someone could bring another lawsuit, it would not
matter—no one wants to help the homeless, they just want them gone. 7
This economic hopelessness, physical danger, and public disapproval
comprises the daily experience of many unhoused individuals 8 living in

2. See id. (“King County shelters for single adults are more than 90 percent full on any given
night, and families are routinely turned away.”).
3. See Second Amended Complaint—Class Action for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 21,
Hooper v. City of Seattle, No. C17-77, 2017 WL 4410029 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 4, 2017), aff’d sub nom.
Willis v. City of Seattle, 943 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2019) [hereinafter Complaint].
4. Id. at 35–36.
5. Id. at 46.
6. See Brief of Amici Curiae of Disability Rights Washington, et al. in Support of Appellants at
20–21, Willis v. City of Seattle, 943 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-35053) [hereinafter Washington
et al. Amicus Brief].
7. When interviewed by NPR, a victim of similar sweeps in Los Angeles, California, said,
“We’re targeted because Los Angeles look at us like cockroaches instead of human beings . . . . We’re
no longer human beings out here. Homeless people are cockroaches to society now.” Leila Fadel &
Kirk Siegler, How Boise’s Fight over Homelessness Is Rippling Along the West Coast, NPR (Dec. 13,
2019, 5:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/13/787861253/how-boises-fight-over-homelessness-isrippling-across-the-west-coast [https://perma.cc/HMZ2-PNB9]; see also Complaint, supra note 3, at 6
(“Defendants’ submissions in this case confirm what Plaintiffs have long known, that Defendants have
no respect for their property rights because they view these possessions as nothing more than
garbage.”).
8. This Recent Development uses “homelessness” when referencing the broader systemic issue
of individuals lacking traditional forms of housing. However, this Recent Development uses only
“unhoused,” rather than “homeless,” when referencing unhoused individuals themselves to mirror the
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encampments across the United States. With no resources of their own to
pursue justice, these individuals must rely on outside legal organizations like
the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) to pursue justice on their behalf.
The ACLU has done just that by initiating legal action in response to sweeps
of homeless encampments in several cities, including Seattle, Washington (the
“City”). 9
In Willis v. City of Seattle, 10 the ACLU brought to light the tragic and brutal
reality that unhoused individuals in the City face as a result of the City’s
sweeps. Seeking strength and maximum effectiveness in numbers, the ACLU
requested declaratory and injunctive relief 11 on behalf of those individuals as a
class. 12 The court tossed out their case, however, just as the City tossed out the
plaintiffs’ belongings in the sweeps. Rather than assessing the plaintiffs’ claims
on the merits, the court held that their claims could not be addressed at all due
to a failure to meet the requirements of a class action lawsuit under Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP 23”). 13 Due to this procedural
issue, the plaintiffs never had a chance to demonstrate the merits of their
constitutional claims against the City.
At first blush, the legal standards and concepts discussed in Willis seem
abstract and conceptually harmless. However, the Willis court’s decision to deny
the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification 14 has grave real-world consequences
for those experiencing homelessness across the United States. Encampments of

complaint in Willis v. City of Seattle, 943 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2019), which provides the following
explanation:
“Unhoused” refers to all individuals who lack fixed, stable, or adequate shelter or housing.
While the term “homeless” is often utilized to refer to this population, we use the term
“unhoused” because people who lack permanent or stable housing still have homes in which
they sleep and go about their private affairs.
Complaint, supra note 3, at 13 n.2.
9. See, e.g., ACLU Calls for a Halt of Homeless Sweeps During Pandemic, KITV (Aug. 14,
2020, 8:09 PM), https://www.kitv.com/story/42499067/aclu-calls-for-a-halt-of-homeless-sweepsduring-pandemic [https://perma.cc/UV54-ZLFN]; Katie McKeller, ACLU: Salt Lake County May Be
Violating Rights in Homeless Camp Cleanup Sweeps, DESERET NEWS, https://www.deseret.com/
utah/2019/12/23/21035312/aclu-salt-lake-city-homeless-camp-clean-up-cleanups-improperly-noticed
[https://perma.cc/8MNJ-GPV4] (last updated Dec. 23, 2019, 5:12 PM); Michael Risher, The California
Transportation Department Is Cruelly and Unconstitutionally Destroying Homeless People’s Belongings, ACLU
(Dec. 15, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/human-rights/california-transportationdepartment-cruelly-and-unconstitutionally-destroying [https://perma.cc/F7DY-FVZ3].
10. 943 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2019).
11. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the City’s sweeps were unlawful and
injunctive relief to prevent the City from conducting additional sweeps. Complaint, supra note 3, at 6.
12. Id. at 13.
13. Willis, 943 F.3d at 887–88.
14. Id.
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unhoused individuals have been reported in every state 15 and are often
“addressed”—to put it delicately—with sweeps, in which the local government
confiscates and destroys their personal property. 16 Given the lack of precedent
by higher courts concerning the constitutionality of these sweeps, 17 the
procedural outcome in Willis encourages continued sweeps in the Ninth Circuit,
and particularly in California and Hawaii where sweeps are becoming
increasingly common. 18 The Willis decision could also be used to defeat
challenges brought in other jurisdictions where sweeps occur, such as Colorado,
Florida, and the District of Columbia. 19 Given the potential weight and
widespread effect of the Willis decision on vulnerable populations and pleading
standards alike, it must not stand. Otherwise, unhoused individuals will not be
able to effectively challenge the merciless seizure and destruction of their
possessions.
These potential negative effects can be prevented by remedying the Willis
court’s misapplication of precedent and enduring legal standards. Had the Willis
majority properly applied the standard established in Ashcroft v. Iqbal 20 for
determining whether a plausible claim exists, it would have found that the
plaintiffs plausibly pleaded that the City’s sweep policies are unconstitutional
as written. Because such a facial challenge to the policies satisfies one of the
requirements for class action certifications—commonality 21 —the class would
have been certified and the case could have been adjudicated on the merits.
However, the plaintiffs in Willis were not afforded this opportunity. As a result,
these unhoused individuals have no other practical means of vindicating their
basic human rights and continue to suffer the seizure and destruction of their
property, even in the throes of a global pandemic. 22
15. NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, TENT CITY, USA: THE GROWTH OF
AMERICA’S HOMELESS ENCAMPMENTS AND HOW COMMUNITIES ARE RESPONDING 21 (2017)
[hereinafter TENT CITY], https://www.nlchp.org/Tent_City_USA_2017 [https://perma.cc/VNX2EGH4]. North Carolina is no exception. See GENE R. NICHOLS, THE FACES OF POVERTY IN NORTH
CAROLINA, at xi–xix (2018) (describing a dramatic recent increase in the unhoused population—and
encampments—in the foothills town of Hickory, North Carolina).
16. TENT CITY, supra note 15, at 8–9.
17. Anna Maria Barry-Jester, Sweeps of Homeless Camps in California Aggravate Key Health Issues,
NPR (Jan. 10, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/01/10/794616155/
sweeps-of-homeless-camps-in-california-aggravate-key-health-issues [https://perma.cc/M54U-D2GV]
(discussing the lack of higher-court precedent as to whether destroying or confiscating the personal
property of unhoused individuals in sweeps is unconstitutional).
18. See TENT CITY, supra note 15, at 28–38.
19. Id. at 8–10.
20. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
21. The commonality requirement will be addressed in Part III, but to provide context for the
argument, “commonality” is one of the pleading requirements of FRCP 23 and requires that a class
action must present “questions of law or fact common to the class.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
22. See Dae Shik Kim Jr. & Guy Oron, Seattle Destroyed Homeless Encampments as the Pandemic
Raged, NATION (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/seattle-homeless-sweepscoronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/BXS8-9JBM].
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This Recent Development addresses the legal issues and implications of
the Willis decision before turning to the larger policy concerns involved. Part I
provides the factual and legal background of Willis. Part II demonstrates why
the plaintiffs’ pleadings were sufficient to bring a facial challenge under the
standards established by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP
8”) and Iqbal. Part III explains why the facial challenge should have been
sufficient to satisfy the FRCP 23 requirements for certifying a class. Finally,
Part IV discusses the policy implications of Willis with respect to one of
America’s most vulnerable populations—unhoused individuals.
I. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF WILLIS V. CITY OF SEATTLE
A.

The Sweeps: Origins, Policies, and Application

The mayor of the City declared a state of emergency in 2015 23 in response
to the increasing number of unhoused individuals in the City. 24 Rather than
responding to homelessness as the emergency it is, however, the City has
continued to treat unhoused individuals as if they are the problem. 25 Since 2015,
the City has expended considerable resources 26 on conducting over one
23. Daniel Beekman & Jack Broom, Mayor, County Exec Declare ‘State of Emergency’ over
Homelessness, SEATTLE TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/mayor-countyexec-declare-state-of-emergency-over-homelessness/ [https://perma.cc/X7HG-HHLH] (Jan. 31, 2016,
10:41 AM).
24. See U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV., HUD 2019 CONTINUUM OF CARE HOMELESS
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS HOMELESS POPULATIONS AND SUBPOPULATIONS 1 (2019), https://
files.hudexchange.info/reports/published/CoC_PopSub_State_WA_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/57EA
-4LZ8] (finding that of 21,577 total unhoused individuals, 9,557 were unsheltered while 8,378 were in
emergency shelters and 3,642 had traditional housing).
25. This criminalization of homelessness is becoming increasingly common and more cities
are taking punitive law enforcement approaches to address visible homelessness. See TENT CITY,
supra note 15, at 8–9. However, some states have taken a more progressive approach by
implementing “Housing First” policies, which focus on providing housing first, then other services
such as mental health treatment or substance abuse treatment second. See John M. Glionna, Utah
Is Winning the War on Chronic Homelessness with ‘Housing First’ Program, L.A. TIMES (May
24, 2015, 4:30 AM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-utah-housing-first-20150524-story.html
[https://perma.cc/MQ5L-2SDF]; Michael Wilt, “Housing First” Policy Helps Communities Combat
Veteran Homelessness, TSAHC (Aug. 14, 2015), https://www.tsahc.org/blog/post/housing-first-policyhelps-communities-combat-veteran-homelessness [https://perma.cc/8DZ6-4DDQ]. Some have
suggested implementing a similar Housing First policy in the City, coupled with providing more
affordable housing. Natalie Brand, Seattle Lacks ‘Coherent Strategy’ To Fight Homelessness,
Expert Says, KING5, https://www.king5.com/article/news/politics/seattle-lacks-coherent-strategy-tofight-homelessness-expert-says/281-552841013 [https://perma.cc/SZV9-ABV7] (May 17, 2018, 9:50
AM).
26. According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, “[a]pproximately one third of the more than $7 million
the City secured as a result of its State of Emergency Declaration was spent removing the homes of
people living outside and seizing and destroying their property.” Complaint, supra note 3, at 23. The
funds were broken down into three categories: $2.9 million for “[p]revention efforts,” $2.5 million for
“[s]upporting people to move out of encampments,” and $2.2 million for “[m]eeting basic needs.”
Bryan Cohen, Seattle Has $7.6 Million Emergency Plan for Homeless and Encampment Sweeps, CAPITOL
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thousand sweeps. 27 During these sweeps, personnel employed by the City or
the Washington State Department of Transportation (“WSDOT”) seize and
often destroy the property of unhoused individuals under the guise of cleaning
up the city. 28
The policies and procedures for these sweeps are found in the City’s
Multi-Departmental Administrative Rules 17-01 (“MDAR 17-01”) 29 and
WSDOT’s “Guidelines to Address Illegal Encampments Within State Right of
Way” (collectively, “Sweep Policies”). 30 The City and WSDOT (the named
defendants in Willis) 31 promulgated the Sweep Policies, which give the City and
WSDOT personnel the authority to seize and destroy the belongings of
unhoused individuals. 32
The ACLU brought suit on behalf of the unhoused individuals subject to
the Sweep Policies by filing suit in the Western District of Washington in
September 2017. 33 The proposed class of plaintiffs in Willis was comprised of
over two thousand “unhoused persons who live outside within the City of
Seattle, Washington and who keep their belongings on public property.” 34
These individuals were subject to the defendants’ sweeps and had their personal
property seized or destroyed by the City and WSDOT personnel as a result. 35
According to the complaint, the defendants acted “without a warrant, probable
HILL SEATTLE (Feb. 9, 2016, 9:45 PM), https://www.capitolhillseattle.com/2016/02/seattle-has-7-6million-emergency-plan-for-homeless-and-encampment-sweeps/ [https://perma.cc/T5MN-VMC2].
WSDOT spent “approximately $250,000 a year removing unhoused people’s property.” Complaint,
supra note 3, at 23.
27. Complaint, supra note 3, at 22–23.
28. Id. at 36; see also Mike Baker, Chaos, Trash and Tears: Inside Seattle’s Flawed Homeless Sweeps,
SEATTLE TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/homeless/chaos-trash-and-tears-insideseattles-flawed-homeless-sweeps/ [https://perma.cc/5B4V-59W5] (Oct. 12, 2017, 3:11 PM); Ansel
Herz, How the City of Seattle Trashes Homeless People’s Belongings and Chases Them Around Town,
STRANGER (Apr. 6, 2016, 10:28 AM), https://www.thestranger.com/slog/2016/04/06/23909768/howthe-city-of-seattle-trashes-homeless-peoples-belongings-and-chases-them-around-town
[https://
perma.cc/8QYQ-R9KH]; Mitch Pittman, ‘We are Spring Cleaning:’ Seattle Conducts Homeless Camp
Cleanups Along I-5 in U-District, KOMO NEWS (Mar. 17, 2017), https://komonews.com/news/local/weare-spring-cleaning-city-conducts-more-homeless-camp-cleanups-along-i-5-in-seattle
[https://perma.cc/D5UQ-ZLXM].
29. MDAR 17-01 was adopted by the City in 2017 as an amendment to its 2008 version, titled
“MDAR 08-01.” Willis v. City of Seattle, 943 F.3d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 2019). The plaintiffs in Willis
amended their complaint on May 23, 2017, because their original complaint was filed on January 19,
2017—prior to the adoption of MDAR 17-01. See Complaint—Class Action for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief at 36, Hooper v. City of Seattle, No. C17-77, 2017 WL 4410029 (W.D. Wash. Oct.
4, 2017), aff’d sub nom. Willis v. City of Seattle, 943 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2019); Complaint, supra note
3, at 28, 50.
30. Willis, 943 F.3d at 884.
31. Complaint, supra note 3, at 23.
32. Id. at 23–29.
33. Id. at 50.
34. Id. at 17–18.
35. Id. at 18.
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cause, adequate notice, an opportunity to have a meaningful pre- or postdeprivation hearing, or an opportunity to retrieve vital personal property before
its seizure or destruction.” 36
B.

The Lawsuit: The Plaintiffs’ Claims and Procedural History

The plaintiffs in Willis brought both facial and as-applied challenges to the
Sweep Policies, 37 but the court focused solely on the facial challenge for
purposes of class certification. 38 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’
policies and practices were “unnecessarily cruel” and violated the plaintiffs’:
1. right to protection from unreasonable search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; 39
2. right to protection from invasion of homes and privacy under
Article I, Section 7 of the Washington State Constitution; 40
3. right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution; and . . . the Washington State Constitution. 41
As part of their facial challenge, the plaintiffs argued that the Sweep Policies
were impermissibly vague and overbroad due to (1) several poorly defined key

36. Id.
37. Hooper v. City of Seattle, No. C17-77, 2017 WL 4410029, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 4, 2017),
aff’d sub nom. Willis v. City of Seattle, 943 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2019).
38. This Recent Development will also focus solely on the facial challenge (rather than the asapplied challenge) since the Willis dissent agreed with the Willis majority that the “plaintiffs failed to
show their as-applied claims pose common questions for purposes of” FRCP 23 class certification.
Willis v. City of Seattle, 943 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2019) (Christen, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
39. Complaint, supra note 3, at 3.
40. Id. “Home” has been interpreted to include tent-like structures of unhoused individuals. See,
e.g., State v. Pippin, 403 P.3d 907, 914–15 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017) (invoking the protection of article I,
section 7 of the Washington Constitution despite the unhoused individual’s lack of permission to camp
at the location). In addition, Washington courts have held that article I, section 7 of the Washington
Constitution provides more protection than the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Groom, 947
P.2d 240, 244 (Wash. 1997) (en banc) (“Article I, section 7 is more protective of the home than is the
Fourth Amendment, and the cases reflect the heightened constitutional protection afforded the home
under the state constitution.”); D.A.H. v. Seattle Times Co. (In re Det. of D.A.H.), 924 P.2d 49, 53
(Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (“Our state constitution provides greater privacy protection than the
expectations created by the Fourth Amendment.”); State v. Cleator, 857 P.2d 306, 309 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1993) (“[A]rticle 1, section 7 provides greater protection for privacy interests than the Fourth
Amendment . . . .”).
41. Complaint, supra note 3, at 3.
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terms, 42 (2) the exceptions that permeated any notice requirements, 43 and (3)
the lack of adequate storage and means of retrieving seized personal property. 44
Perhaps surprisingly, the plaintiffs did not seek compensation for the
financial losses or emotional damages caused by the sweeps; they simply
requested declaratory and injunctive relief. 45 They were tired of “repeatedly
moving all of their belongings and living in constant fear of the pending seizure
and destruction” of the few things they owned in the world. 46 They just wanted
the sweeps to cease.
Given the near impossibility and unlikely success of single-handedly
taking on the City and WSDOT, the plaintiffs sought strength in numbers via
class certification. While the ACLU could have challenged the defendants’
Sweep Policies by bringing individual claims on behalf of an unhoused
individual subjected to the sweeps, a class action structure was practically and
strategically necessary to provide the appropriate relief to all unhoused
individuals harmed by the sweeps. 47

42. Several terms within the Sweep Policies are defined only by example, including, “apparent
utility” and “personal property,” while others—such as “hazard” and “obstruction”—have overbroad or
vague definitions that give the defendants’ personnel too much discretion. Id. at 27–29. See infra
Section II.B for a discussion of the vague terms.
43. Most of the exceptions pertain to the City’s obligation to provide notice before conducting
the sweeps. For example, no notice is required for:
• individuals who do not live in tents, lean-tos, or other “structures”;
• individuals who do live in a “structure,” but are 300 feet or more away from an
encampment, living alone, or living next to only one other person;
• “sites where an encampment has been observed three or more times within any 60 day
period . . . . [E]ven if none of the current residents lived there within the prior 60 days, or
were otherwise unaware that a notice for the area had been posted at some point within the
last 8 years”; and
• sites where it is not “‘practical’ or ‘feasible’ to post notice because of ‘[c]rew scheduling,
emergency repairs and removal of nuisances,’ or other situations ‘where the maintenance
activity cannot wait or be predicted.’” Complaint, supra note 3, at 24–25.
Additional exceptions apply even if notice must be posted:
• The notice does not have to be written in such a way that it accommodates “people with
limited English proficiency, limited literacy, or disabilities (such as blindness).” Id. at 26.
• The sweep does not have to actually occur on the date or time given in the notice. Id.
Another sweeping exception states that “[e]ach Region may exercise its discretion to deviate from these
[Sweep Policies] if the Region determines that coordination with a local jurisdiction on a specific cleanup activity is the best course of action under the circumstances.” Complaint, supra note 3, at 27.
44. Id. at 27–29.
45. Id. at 6. See infra Section III.A for a discussion of the implications of this strategic decision.
46. Complaint, supra note 3, at 47.
47. See Maureen Carroll, Aggregation for Me, but Not for Thee: The Rise of Common Claims in NonClass Litigation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2017, 2028–39 (2015) (discussing the incentives for pursuing a
common claim via class action, rather than an individual suit).
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One strategic advantage of bringing a class action instead of an individual
claim is that the constitutional challenge to the Sweep Policies could continue
if an individual plaintiff obtained housing. 48 Moreover, “the absence of class
treatment undermines the court’s ability to consider the full range of relevant
facts and interests when determining liability and fashioning relief.” 49 There
are some advantages to bringing an individual claim as well, of course. For
example, there would be no need to satisfy the FRCP 23 class action
requirements, the case would likely be resolved more expeditiously, and the
court could tailor relief to the specific unhoused plaintiff’s needs. Although
appealing, these advantages fail to outweigh the benefits of the class action
route. Pursuing an individual claim would not only forfeit the aforementioned
benefits afforded to a class of plaintiffs but would also rob many unhoused
individuals of the relief they desperately need. By bringing a class action claim,
the ACLU could ensure that any legal remedy mandated by the courts would
apply broadly to other similarly situated unhoused individuals subject to the
sweeps. 50
However, bringing a class action instead of an individual claim subjects
plaintiffs to additional procedural hurdles. 51 This was precisely the issue in
Willis, as the court ruled that the plaintiffs did not meet the requisite standards
for class certification and denied their request for relief. 52 The plaintiffs
appealed the district court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit, but they were again
denied the opportunity to adjudicate their claims on the merits. 53
II. ADEQUACY OF THE PLEADINGS
Understanding the legal and practical contexts of Willis is vital to
understanding why its resolution is improper. This part uses the pleading
standards established in FRCP 8 and Iqbal 54 to discuss why the plaintiffs’

48. Id. at 2037–38. In an individual suit, however, the claim would be rendered moot and the case
would be dismissed once the plaintiff obtained housing. Id.
49. Id. at 2021. To obtain the broadest form of relief possible via an individual suit, the ACLU
would have had to engage in the difficult—if not impossible—task of finding a representative plaintiff
who experienced each and every harm the plaintiffs in Willis collectively experienced as a result of the
sweeps. Otherwise, the relief would be limited to only those specific harms that the representative
plaintiff experienced. See id. at 2030–34.
50. See id. at 2030–31 (explaining that granting system-wide relief is the result of a meritorious
class action suit, but that such relief is not necessarily granted in nonclass litigation and is generally
prohibited).
51. See infra Section III.A.
52. Hooper v. City of Seattle, No. C17-77, 2017 WL 4410029, at *16 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 4, 2017),
aff’d sub nom. Willis v. City of Seattle, 943 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2019).
53. Willis v. City of Seattle, 943 F.3d 882, 887–88 (9th Cir. 2019).
54. Notably, Iqbal built upon the plausibility standard the Supreme Court established in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), by expanding its applicability from antitrust cases alone
to all cases. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“[T]he pleading standard [FRCP] 8 announces
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pleadings in Willis were sufficient to bring a plausible facial challenge to the
defendants’ Sweep Policies. Given that Willis concerned the denial of a class
certification—governed by FRCP 23—one might wonder why a FRCP 8
analysis of the adequacy of the plaintiffs’ pleadings is relevant to the inquiry.
To clarify, while FRCP 23 governs class certification, such determinations first
require review of the pleadings according to FRCP 8. 55 Thus, FRCP 8 is often
the operative standard. If, unlike in Willis, the court determines that the
pleadings collectively pose an adequate facial challenge under FRCP 8, then its
analysis proceeds to the second question of whether to certify the class under
FRCP 23 based on the facial challenge. 56
The majority in Willis, however, narrowly focused its analysis almost
exclusively on the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification 57 rather than the
pleadings as a whole. 58 More specifically, the majority only looked to the “five
questions of fact and law in support of [the plaintiffs’] commonality argument
in their motion for class certification,” 59 and refused to certify the class because
it deemed that section inadequate to bring a facial challenge to the defendants’
Sweep Policies. 60
A.

Pleadings Standards Under FRCP 8 and Iqbal

According to FRCP 8, “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must
contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” 61 Furthermore, the “allegations in the complaint [must] ‘give

does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).
55. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2013) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon,
457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982)) (explaining that a class certification analysis will frequently “overlap with the
merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim” because a “class determination generally involves
considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of
action”).
56. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (stating that “[FRCP] 23 does
not set forth a mere pleading standard” and that the court must “probe behind the pleadings” in a
separate analysis before certifying a class).
57. The majority makes a passing reference to the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, but only
in response to the dissent’s argument. Willis, 943 F.3d at 887 (“The Appellants’ Second Amended
Complaint also makes general and conclusory statements about the [Sweep Policies’] deficiencies,
without arguing that a single policy would be unconstitutional in all its applications.”).
58. The majority’s failure to consider the complaint as a whole runs contrary to binding precedent.
See, e.g., Argueta v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 643 F.3d 60, 74 (3d Cir. 2011) (recognizing that
“Iqbal made it clear that courts must determine whether the complaint as a whole contains sufficient
factual matter to state a facially plausible claim”); In re VeriFone Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 704 F.3d
694, 703 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that the court cannot “unduly focus on the weakness of individual
allegations to the exclusion of the whole picture”).
59. Willis, 943 F.3d at 886.
60. Id. at 887–88.
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
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the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.’” 62
The Supreme Court first refined this standard as applied to antitrust cases
in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 63 then, in Iqbal, expanded the standard to apply
to all plaintiffs. 64 In Iqbal, the Court established a two-part analysis of pleadings
that first requires stripping away mere legal conclusions or conclusory
allegations, leaving only factual allegations. 65 Then, judges “must accept as true
all of the allegations” and assess whether a plausible claim for relief exists. 66 If
the facts give rise to a reasonable inference that a defendant is liable, then the
claim is plausible and can proceed to adjudication on the merits. 67
These standards have some flexibility and inherent deference toward
plaintiffs. First, courts must accept all factual allegations as true, leaving all
credibility determinations and fact-finding duties to a jury. 68 Second, courts
must take all relevant context into consideration when “determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim.” 69 Third, courts must ensure that
“[p]leadings [are] construed so as to do justice,” as mandated by FRCP 8. 70
B.

Misapplication of the Iqbal Standard to the Facial Challenge Assessment in
Willis

The Supreme Court has defined a facial challenge as a claim that “a law is
unconstitutional in all of its applications.” 71 Essentially, a facial challenge argues
that a policy is unconstitutional as written, rather than unconstitutional only in
its application to a particular group of individuals (known as an “as-applied”
challenge). While facial challenges are often difficult to bring successfully, Iqbal
limits a court’s assessment at the class certification stage to whether a plausible—
not a meritorious—facial challenge exists. 72
62. Updike v. Multnomah County, 870 F.3d 939, 952 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Pickern v. Pier 1
Imps. (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2006)).
63. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
64. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading
standard for ‘all civil actions,’ and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike.” (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56)).
65. Id. at 679.
66. Id. at 678.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 679 (emphasizing that “determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim” is
context specific).
70. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e).
71. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2451 (2015) (quoting Wash. State Grange v.
Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008)).
72. See Willis v. City of Seattle, 943 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2019) (Christen, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“The City was right to concede the existence of the facial claims, but it
badly missed the mark when it conflated the merits of the facial claims with whether the claims
presented a common question.”).
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Here, the proper inquiry under Iqbal is whether the plaintiffs in Willis
“plead factual matter that, if taken as true, states a claim” that the Sweep
Policies were facially unconstitutional. 73 In answering the first part of this
question, the court should have taken the complaint “as a whole,” looking to all
factual allegations contained in the plaintiffs’ pleadings. 74
However, in direct contrast with Iqbal, the Willis majority did not look at
the entirety of the pleadings but only to the section in the plaintiffs’ motion for
class certification containing the common questions of fact and law. 75
To its credit, the majority did not explicitly disregard Iqbal. Rather, it
simply conducted its analysis in a backward manner, thus narrowing its scope. 76
If the majority had initially assessed whether a plausible facial challenge existed,
it would have looked at the plaintiffs’ complaint as a whole. By jumping to the
FRCP 23 commonality issue instead, the majority did not look to the entire
complaint, but only the section containing the common questions of law and
fact. As a result of this narrow review—in direct conflict with Iqbal and FRCP
8 standards—the majority found no plausible facial challenge. 77

73. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 666. Importantly, this Iqbal analysis—which the Willis court did not
properly conduct—is separate from the question of whether the plaintiffs satisfied the class certification
requirements of FRCP 23. Class certification is discussed below in Part III.
74. A court must look to a complaint “as a whole” and cannot “unduly focus on the weakness of
individual allegations to the exclusion of the whole picture.” In re VeriFone Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
704 F.3d 694, 703 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Argueta v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 643 F.3d 60, 74
(3d Cir. 2011) (stating that “Iqbal made it clear that courts must determine whether the complaint as a
whole contains sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim” (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
666)).
75. The common questions of fact and law asserted by the plaintiffs in this section read as follows:
a. Whether Defendants have a practice and policy of seizing and destroying the personal
property of people living outside without a warrant, probable cause, adequate notice, an
opportunity to have a meaningful pre- or post-deprivation hearing, or an opportunity to
retrieve vital personal property before its seizure or destruction;
b. Whether Defendants’ custom, policy, or practice violates the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights
against unreasonable search and seizures under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution;
c. Whether Defendants’ custom, policy, or practice violates class members’ right to privacy
under Article I, Section 7 of the Washington State Constitution;
d. Whether Defendants’ custom, policy, or practice violates class members’ constitutional
rights to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of U.S. Constitution; and
e. Whether Defendants’ custom, policy, or practice violates class members’ constitutional
rights to procedural due process under Article I, Section 3 of the Washington State
Constitution.
Complaint, supra note 3, at 18–19.
76. Willis, 943 F.3d at 885–88 (finding no facial challenge after analyzing the complaint strictly
under FRCP 23).
77. Id. at 886.
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To conduct a proper Iqbal analysis, the majority in Willis should have first
identified the factual allegations presented throughout the pleadings—not just in
the common questions section of the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.
Ironically, the majority criticized the dissent for looking to various “statements
from the ‘Factual Background’ section” within the motion “to argue that [the
plaintiffs] adequately presented a facial challenge.” 78 However, according to
Iqbal, this is exactly what the majority should have done in order to examine the
pleadings “as a whole.” 79
The factual background section of the plaintiffs’ motion for class
certification specifically identified the Sweep Policies and then stated that these
“official policies fail on their face to provide requisite procedural safeguards.” 80
In addition, the plaintiffs explicitly stated that the “[d]efendants’ policies
contemplate on their face arbitrary enforcement and unbridled employee
discretion, and lack meaningful oversight and enforcement mechanisms.” 81 The
facts alleged in the complaint support these assertions by citing various
definitions pulled from both MDAR 08-01 and the Sweep Policies—such as
“personal property,” 82 “hazard” 83 or “hazardous” items, 84 “obstruction,” 85 and

78. Id. at 887.
79. In re VeriFone Holdings, 704 F.3d at 703; see also Argueta, 643 F.3d at 74.
80. Motion for Class Certification at 5, Hooper v. City of Seattle, No. C17-77, 2017 WL 4410029
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 4, 2017), aff’d sub nom. Willis v. City of Seattle, 943 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2019)
(emphasis added).
81. Id.
82. The complaint outlines the City’s definition of personal property as being “limited to items
which have ‘apparent utility,’ are defined by example, or ‘have a reasonable value of more than $25.’
The MDAR does not consider building materials to be personal property . . . .’” Complaint, supra note
3, at 27. The complaint states that the “WSDOT Guidelines similarly define personal property by
example, and provide minimal criteria for determining whether an item should be stored.” Id.
83. The complaint outlines the City’s definition of hazard as
situations in which the City unilaterally determines people are “at risk of injury or death
beyond that caused by increased exposure to the elements; or their presence creates a risk of
injury or death to others, including but not limited to encampments at highway shoulders and
off-ramps, areas exposed to moving vehicles, area that can only be accessed by crossing driving
lanes outside of a legal crosswalk, and landslide-prone areas.”
Id. at 29.
84. The complaint asserts that under the City’s definition, hazardous items “can include items
that are wet or muddy because they are kept outside.” Id. at 27.
85. The complaint outlines the City’s definition of “obstruction” to include
people, tents, personal property, garbage, debris or other objects related to an encampment
that: are in a City park or on a public sidewalk; interfere with the pedestrian or transportation
purposes of public rights-of-way; or [the City unilaterally determines] interfere with areas
that are necessary for or essential the intended use of a public property or facility.
Id. at 29 (alterations in original).

99 N.C. L. REV. 821 (2021)

834

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99

“emphasis areas” 86 —as problematic in light of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Ultimately, the plaintiffs argued that the vague nature of these definitions
rendered the “[d]efendants’ official policies and proposed rules unconstitutional
as written.” 87
Given that a policy can be unconstitutional on its face if impermissibly
vague, 88 the plaintiffs’ factual allegations raised a plausible facial challenge. 89
According to the second prong of the Iqbal pleading standard, the Willis court
should have taken the factual allegations presented in these sections 90 as true
and then found a plausible facial challenge to the Sweep Policies as overly
vague. 91 Upon correct application of the pleading standards, “the record plainly
shows that [the] plaintiffs brought [plausible] facial challenges.” 92
While addressing the dissent’s argument that a facial challenge existed, the
majority concedes that the plaintiffs “mention in passing in their motion that
sweeps were conducted ‘pursuant to official policies,’ and later that the [Sweep
P]olicies ‘fail on their face to provide requisite procedural safeguards.’” 93 To
prevent this concession from destroying their argument, however, the majority
states that the plaintiffs failed to assert that “a single policy would be
unconstitutional in all its applications,” 94 as mandated by the Supreme Court in
City of Los Angeles v. Patel. 95 Conversely, the complaint explicitly states that
“[e]ven if [the d]efendants’ sweeps were conducted fully in accordance with
86. The complaint asserts that the City’s Sweep Policies “allow the City to declare ‘emphasis
areas’ wherein camping is prohibited at all times,” yet “provide no criteria for what can constitute an
emphasis area: one can be of any size and anywhere within the City limits, as long as it is somewhere
an unauthorized encampment has previously existed and been swept.” Id. at 30.
87. Id. at 32.
88. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (“As generally stated, the void-forvagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness
that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”).
89. To reiterate, the facial claim need not be meritorious at this stage; the court should simply
determine whether it is plausible. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
90. In addition to the aforementioned factual allegations concerning the overbroad and vague
definitions of the Sweep Policies, the complaint presents additional factual allegations. First, the
exceptions to the defendants’ Sweep Policies on their face make it impossible for people living outside
to safely live and store their belongings without constant risk that everything will be taken from them
with no notice. Complaint, supra note 3, 27–30. Second, not only are the defendants’ official Sweep
Policies unconstitutional as written, but the defendants also have conducted and approved of
longstanding and ongoing practices that violate even the most basic portions of their own Sweep
Policies, along with the U.S. Constitution and Washington Constitutions. Id. at 22–24.
91. These claims need not be meritorious at the class certification stage. Their merit is assessed
once the class has been certified. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
92. Willis v. City of Seattle, 943 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2019) (Christen, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
93. Id. at 887 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
94. Id.
95. 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2449 (2015).
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both the MDAR and the WSDOT Guidelines, they would still be
unconstitutional.” 96 This allegation and its associated facts clearly pose a facial
challenge to the Sweep Policies by asserting that the sweeps cannot be
conducted constitutionally. 97 This is sufficient to satisfy both FRCP 8 and the
Iqbal standard. 98
Putting aside the court’s improperly narrowed analysis for a moment,
FRCP 8 additionally counsels in favor of the plaintiffs. 99 Courts have
historically leaned on FRCP 8’s mandate to construe pleadings “so as to do
justice,” 100 and there is no reason why that deferential standard should be altered
or ignored in Willis. The plaintiffs here were one of the most vulnerable
populations imaginable—one that would almost certainly lack any recourse for
the violation of their constitutional rights outside a class action suit. Therefore,
when assessing the plaintiff’s pleadings under Iqbal as a whole 101—rather than
just a small section of one motion—and keeping in mind the plaintiff-friendly
underpinnings of FRCP 8 as a whole, the plaintiffs in Willis pled sufficient facts
to give rise to a reasonable inference that the Sweep Policies are facially
unconstitutional.
III. SATISFACTION OF THE FRCP 23 REQUIREMENTS
While FRCP 8 describes pleading standards, FRCP 23 details the
elements necessary for class certification. The relationship between FRCP 8
and FRCP 23 can be a difficult one to grasp, but explaining this relationship at
the outset will foster a greater understanding of the analysis in this part. As Part
II explained, the FRCP 8 and Iqbal standards are used to analyze the pleadings
and determine whether a plausible facial challenge exists. A plausible facial
challenge—by its very nature—is a common question of law: whether the

96. Complaint, supra note 3, at 24.
97. Willis, 943 F.3d at 889 (Christen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“There is no
way to read this allegation as anything other than a contention that defendants’ policies are
unconstitutional no matter how they are applied.”).
98. Id. (“In the language of Patel, this was an unambiguous assertion that defendants’ policies are
unconstitutional ‘in all of [their] applications.’” (quoting Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2451)).
99. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e); Starks v. Perloff Bros., Inc., 760 F.2d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1985) (“An overly
restrictive reading of a complaint is inconsistent with the mandate that ‘pleadings shall be so construed
as to do substantial justice.’” (quoting Richardson v. Pa. Dep’t of Health, 561 F.2d 489, 492 (3d Cir.
1977))); Peoples Nat. Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 127 F.2d 153, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (“[W]e are
required to construe the pleadings so as to do substantial justice . . . .”).
100. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Cate, No. 08-CV-01196, 2014 WL 3689287, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 23,
2014) (“Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim challenges the CDCR’s statewide policy. Although
not explicitly stated, the Court reads Plaintiffs’ allegations as posing a facial challenge to the CDCR’s
policy. Thus, the Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ challenges to commonality that are based upon
its contention that the policy as applied is constitutional.”).
101. See supra notes 63–75 and accompanying text.
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challenged policy or practice is constitutional on its face. 102 Given that FRCP
23 requires a common question of law, inter alia, a plausible facial challenge
logically satisfies this commonality requirement because the legal question of
whether the challenged law is “unconstitutional in all applications” 103 can be
resolved “in one stroke,” as the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart, Inc. v.
Dukes 104 requires. Once the commonality requirement is met, the class will
likely be certified, given that the analyses of the remaining FRCP 23
requirements typically merge with the commonality inquiry in cases evaluating
the constitutionality of a given statute. 105
A.

Overview of FRCP 23 Requirements

Class certification under FRCP 23 first requires plaintiffs to meet the four
requirements of FRCP 23 106:
the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class; and
the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class. 107
These requirements are respectively referred to as (1) numerosity, (2)
commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequate representation. 108
102. See Garris v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 17-1452, 2018 WL 5919214, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb.
9, 2018) (“Cases that involve a facial challenge to a statute satisfy the commonality requirement.”
(citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979) (finding facial due process challenges to the
Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.), “peculiarly appropriate” for class treatment because the “issues involved are common to
the class as a whole” and “turn on questions of law applicable in the same manner to each member of
the class”))), rev’d on other grounds, Garris v. City of Los Angeles, 798 F. App’x 155 (9th Cir. 2020);
Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 957 F. Supp. 306, 325 (D. Mass. 1997) (“[F]acial challenges to . . .
allegedly discriminatory [university policy] involve common questions of fact and law.”).
103. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2450 (2015).
104. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
105. See infra note 148 and accompanying text for further discussion of this domino effect—by
which a facial challenge leads to the satisfaction of the commonality standard which in turn makes the
complaint likely to satisfy other class certification requirements. It is important to emphasize, however,
that this domino effect only occurs in a limited set of circumstances. First, it is limited to cases that
challenge a statute as unconstitutional. Second, plaintiffs must pursue a facial challenge to the statute,
rather than an as-applied challenge. Third, that facial challenge must be plausible. Fourth, a plaintiff
must still provide sufficient evidence to prove that the remaining FRCP 23 elements are required; this
is not guaranteed. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
106. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4) (listing the four requirements); Blake v. Arnett, 663 F.2d 906,
912 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1339 (9th Cir. 1976)).
107. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4).
108. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 349.
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After satisfying these four requirements under FRCP 23, plaintiffs must
then fit into one of the three categories further listed in FRCP 23 for the class
to be certified. 109 The first category—colloquially known as a “(b)(1) class”—is
satisfied if proceeding individually could lead to either (1) “inconsistent or
varying adjudications” and “incompatible standards of conduct” for the
defendants; or would (2) “impair or impede” the ability of other similarlysituated plaintiffs “to protect their interests.” 110 A class fits in the second
category—a “(b)(2) class”—if “the party opposing the class had acted or refused
to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief
or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a
whole.” 111 Finally, the third category—a “(b)(3) class”—is satisfied if “questions
of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and . . . a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy” based
on four factors: predominance, superiority, mandatory notice, and the right to
opt out. 112 Although not addressed at length in the opinion, Willis was
categorized as a (b)(2) class. 113
The Supreme Court recently heightened the standard for assessing
whether a plaintiff satisfies FRCP 23 in Dukes, where the plaintiffs were
ultimately determined to be a (b)(3) class. 114 Acknowledging the context of this
decision is vital to understanding why the standard was heightened and why
Dukes is distinguishable from public interest class actions like Willis. First, the
Court noted at the outset that Dukes was “one of the most expansive class actions
ever,” as the class of plaintiffs in Dukes consisted of over 1.5 million female
employees of Wal-Mart. 115 Second, “Wal-Mart is the Nation’s largest private
employer.” 116 Third, the plaintiffs brought Title VII claims for unlawful
discrimination on the basis of sex in pay and promotions—decisions made
pursuant to “local managers’ broad discretion, which is exercised ‘in a largely

109. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–(3) (outlining the three available categories); Willis v. City of
Seattle, 943 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2019).
110. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1).
111. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
112. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
113. Willis, 943 F.3d at 884.
114. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 362 (2011). While some scholars worried that
class action lawsuits would become altogether too difficult to mount successfully after Dukes, this has
not proven true. See Brief of Civil Procedure Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants (Reversal) at 5 n.3, Willis, 943 F.3d 882 (No. 18-35053) [hereinafter Civ. Pro. Professors’
Amicus Brief] (providing examples of types of successful class actions in the wake of Dukes); Aaron
Bernay, 3 Months After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, LEXISNEXIS LAW 360 (Sept. 14, 2011, 4:18 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/268717/3-months-after-wal-mart-v-dukes [https://perma.cc/4ALY5L43 (dark archive)].
115. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 342.
116. Id.
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subjective manner.’” 117 Fourth, the plaintiffs were seeking not only injunctive
and declaratory relief but also backpay. 118 The Court emphasized the
importance of this last point when categorically distinguishing these claims
from public interest class actions:
[I]ndividualized monetary claims belong in [FRCP] 23(b)(3). The
procedural protections attending the (b)(3) class—predominance,
superiority, mandatory notice, and the right to opt out—are . . .
unnecessary to a (b)(2) class. When a class seeks an indivisible injunction
benefiting all its members at once, there is no reason to undertake a casespecific inquiry into whether class issues predominate or whether class
action is a superior method of adjudicating the dispute. Predominance
and superiority are self-evident. But with respect to each class member’s
individualized claim for money, that is not so . . . . 119
All four of these factors contributed to the majority’s decision in Dukes to
implement a more “rigorous analysis” for (b)(3) class claims. 120 Under the new
Dukes standard, plaintiffs “must affirmatively demonstrate [their] compliance”
with FRCP 23 by proving “that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties,
common questions of law or fact, etc.” 121
In making its determination, however, the court cannot “engage in freeranging merits inquiries at the certification stage.” 122 In fact, the Ninth Circuit
has stated that a court “determining the propriety of a class action” does not
evaluate the strength of the claims, and that “inquiry into the merits” should be
limited to determining whether the requirements of FRCP 23 are met and “may
not go so far . . . as to judge the validity of the claims.” 123 In a more recent case,
the Ninth Circuit clarified that “this does not mean that the plaintiffs must show
at the class certification stage that they will prevail on the merits.” 124 Thus, all
that was necessary for the Willis plaintiffs’ claims to proceed beyond the class
certification stage was the finding that a facial challenge existed. They did not
have to demonstrate that it was meritorious or even likely to succeed. 125

117. Id. at 343.
118. Id. at 345.
119. Id. at 362–63.
120. See id. at 342–67.
121. Id. at 350.
122. Willis v. City of Seattle, 943 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2019) (Christen, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citing Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 466 (2013)).
123. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l
Union v. ConocoPhillips Co., 593 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 2010).
124. Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 676 n.19 (9th Cir. 2014).
125. See Willis, 943 F.3d at 888 (Christen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 466 (2013)) (“Whether a facial challenge
is meritorious is the answer to a common question; it is not a reason to deny class certification.”).
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Facial Challenge as a Common Question of Law

The commonality requirement of FRCP 23 was the central issue in Dukes,
in which the Court ultimately heightened this requirement. 126 The Dukes Court
clarified that “[w]hat matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of
common ‘questions’—even in droves—but, rather, the capacity of a classwide
proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the
litigation.” 127 Now, plaintiffs must demonstrate “a common contention” 128 that
is “capable of classwide resolution,” such that “determination of its truth or
falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims
in one stroke.” 129
The recent Ninth Circuit decision in Parsons v. Ryan, 130 which was binding
law when the court decided Willis, provides a relevant example of the
application of the Dukes heightened commonality standard. Contextually,
Parsons is comparable to Willis but distinguishable from Dukes. Like Willis—but
unlike Dukes—Parsons was a public interest class action concerning members of
a vulnerable population (incarcerated individuals) who sought injunctive relief
against the Arizona Department of Corrections (“ADC”) for harms they
experienced due to medical deficiencies in ten different prison complexes. 131
Unlike the Dukes plaintiffs, the Parsons plaintiffs did not seek monetary damages
but only declaratory and injunctive relief from harmful government practices,
just as the plaintiffs in Willis did. 132 Moreover, the defendants in both Parsons
and Willis were state government entities, not the nation’s largest private
employer. The main distinction between Parsons and Willis, however, is that the
plaintiffs in Parsons brought an as-applied challenge to government policies,
rather than a facial challenge, and thus the plaintiffs in Parsons had to jump
through additional evidentiary hoops to satisfy the commonality
requirement. 133
Citing Dukes, the Parsons court held that the FRCP 23 commonality
requirement was satisfied because the “putative class and subclass members . . .
all set forth numerous common contentions whose truth or falsity can be
determined in one stroke: whether the specified statewide policies and practices

126. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 349.
127. Id. at 350 (alterations in original) (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age
of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)).
128. Id. Though semantically different, there is no operative difference between “common
question” and “common contention,” as Dukes focuses on whether the common question or contention
is capable of classwide resolution. Id.
129. Id.
130. 754 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2014).
131. Id. at 662–63.
132. Id.
133. Compare id. at 674, with Willis v. City of Seattle, 943 F.3d 882, 886–87 (9th Cir. 2019).
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to which they are all subjected by ADC expose them to a substantial risk of
harm” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 134 The court further explained:
These policies and practices are the “glue” that holds together the
putative class and the putative subclass; either each of the policies and
practices is unlawful as to every inmate or it is not. That inquiry does
not require us to determine the effect of those policies and practices upon
any individual class member . . . . 135
Like the Willis majority, the Parson defendants argued that the plaintiffs
could not satisfy the commonality requirement because the “claims are
inherently case specific and turn on many individual inquiries.” 136 The Parsons
defendants “describe[d] the plaintiffs’ claims as little more than an aggregation
of many claims of individual mistreatment,” 137 in an attempt to compare the
Parsons plaintiffs to those in Dukes, who blamed a uniform corporate culture for
sex discrimination in discretionary pay and promotion decisions rather than a
specific company-wide policy. However, the Parsons court distinguished the
two cases by pointing out that “every inmate in ADC custody is necessarily
subject to the same medical, mental health, and dental care policies and practices
of ADC.” 138 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit in Parsons clarified that “[w]here the
circumstances of each particular class member vary but retain a common core
of factual or legal issues with the rest of the class, commonality exists.” 139
Like the plaintiffs in Parsons, the plaintiffs in Willis presented common
contentions capable of class-wide resolution: whether “the City’s Updated
Encampment Rules are unconstitutional on their face” (1) under the Fourth
Amendment due to the “definitions of ‘personal property,’ and ‘hazardous
items”; and (2) “under the Fourteenth Amendment because their definitions of
‘obstruction,’ ‘immediate hazard,’ and the creation of ‘emphasis areas,’
essentially do away with pre-seizure notice and provide City personnel with too
much discretion.” 140 However, because the plaintiffs in Willis did not bring an
as-applied challenge, they did not need to go to the same evidentiary lengths as
the Parsons plaintiffs to satisfy the Dukes commonality standard. The plaintiffs’
facial challenge in Willis, if plausible under the pleading standards of FRCP 8

134. Id. at 678.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 675.
137. Id. at 676.
138. Id. at 678.
139. Id. at 675 (alteration in original) (quoting Evon v. Law Offs. of Sidney Mickell, 688 F.3d
1015, 1029 (9th Cir. 2012)).
140. Willis v. City of Seattle, 943 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2019) (Christen, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting Hooper v. City of Seattle, No. C17-77, 2017 WL 4410029, at *8 (W.D.
Wash. Oct. 4, 2017), aff’d sub nom. Willis v. City of Seattle, 943 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2019)).
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and Iqbal, 141 is sufficient to satisfy the commonality requirement because it is
inherently a common question of law that is capable of classwide resolution.
As argued in an amicus brief by civil procedure professors, “courts
routinely hold that common questions exist in injunctive relief class action
challenges to government policies and practices.” 142 This is true because “when
a policy is facially unconstitutional, it is void—in whole or in part—and that
invalidity applies equally to all class members.” 143 If the plaintiffs are raising
structural challenges to government policies, they pose a “common question”
with a “common answer,” thus making it capable of resolution “in one stroke,”
as required by Dukes. 144 Such claims “lend themselves to class certification
because they often raise generic questions about how system-wide procedures
impact a group of people who depend on those procedures for relief.” 145
Furthermore, invalidating the governmental policies at issue in Willis
would apply to all class members in the same way. 146 If the Sweep Policies in
Willis were declared unconstitutional for impermissible vagueness and
insufficient pre-seizure notice, the sweeps would cease to occur in the same
unconstitutional manner. Ending the sweeps would provide common relief to
all of the plaintiffs. Thus, the plaintiffs’ facial challenge in Willis should have
been enough to satisfy the FRCP 23 commonality standard and certify the class
of unhoused individuals subject to the City’s sweeps.
The only way to deny class certification in Willis was to find that no such
facial challenge existed or that it would not likely prevail on the merits.
However, “[w]hether a facial challenge is meritorious is the answer to a common
question; it is not a reason to deny class certification.” 147 As such, both
arguments are irrelevant to Willis, and should not have barred satisfaction of the
commonality standard.
In sum, the plaintiffs in Willis established a plausible facial challenge to
the defendants’ Sweep Policies. If the majority conducted a proper Iqbal
analysis of the pleadings, it would have found this to be true. Given that facial
claims are inherently common contentions capable of class-wide resolution, the
plaintiffs met the commonality standard under Dukes. Because finding
141. See supra Section II.A.
142. Civ. Pro. Professors’ Amicus Brief, supra note 114, at 2.
143. Id. at 8 (citing Cruz v. Zucker, 195 F. Supp. 3d 554, 565–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)); see also supra
notes 93–96.
144. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011).
145. Civ. Pro. Professors’ Amicus Brief, supra note 114, at 7 (first citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 348 (1976); and then citing Kuck v. Danaher, 600 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 2010)).
146. Id.
147. Willis v. City of Seattle, 943 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2019) (Christen, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citing Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 466 (2013)
(“[FRCP] 23 grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification
stage.”).
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sufficient commonality often creates a domino effect 148 of satisfying the
remaining requirements of FRCP 23—typicality and adequate representation—
the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification should have been granted. With class
certification, the represented unhoused individuals could have adjudicated their
claims on the merits in hopes of receiving protection from the unconstitutional
seizure of the few possessions they own.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
FRCP 23 was designed “to provide means of vindicating the rights of
groups of people who individually would lack effective strength to bring their
opponents into court at all.” 149 While class action lawsuits have undergone
considerable criticism over the years in product liability and toxic tort
contexts, 150 most, if not all, of these criticisms have no place in suits requesting
injunctive relief from unlawful or oppressive government policies and
practices. 151 Some critics argue that class action lawsuits should be subjected to
heightened pleading requirements. 152 This argument rests on the premise that
class action lawsuits generate enormous costs—especially at the discovery
stage—and therefore should not proceed unless resolution in favor of the
plaintiffs is extremely likely. 153 If the plaintiffs are likely to succeed, the class
action should proceed because the costs of litigation will be justified. 154
Proponents of this view are essentially suggesting a “mini-trial” on the merits
at the pleading stage for class action lawsuits, regardless of their subject. 155
However fiscally responsible this approach may sound, there are compelling
legal and policy reasons for refusing to implement this suggested approach.

148. In Dukes, the Supreme Court described this domino effect:
We have previously stated in this context that “[t]he commonality and typicality requirements
of [FRCP] 23(a) tend to merge . . . . Those requirements therefore also tend to merge with
the adequacy-of-representation requirement, although the latter requirement also raises
concerns about the competency of class counsel and conflicts of interest.”
Dukes, 564 U.S. at 349 n.5 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157–58 n.13 (1982)).
149. Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969).
150. See Wade Lambert, Class-Action Suit Is a Target for Criticism from All Sides, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
19, 1996, 10:03 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB829877425363143500 [https://perma.cc/9PCCRLF5 (dark archive)] (criticizing product liability and toxic tort class actions for making greedy lawyers
rich and putting only pennies in plaintiffs’ pockets).
151. See Civ. Pro. Professors’ Amicus Brief, supra note 114, at 13–20.
152. See, e.g., Matthew J.B. Lawrence, Courts Should Apply a Relatively More Stringent Pleading
Threshold to Class Actions, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1225, 1229 (2013).
153. Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions To Dismiss Become (Disguised)
Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 81 (2007).
154. Id.
155. Alcantar v. Hobart Serv., 800 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015); Ellis v. Costco Wholesale
Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 983 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011).
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From a legal standpoint, this argument is directly contrary to FRCP 23,
given that the only inquiry a court makes in a class certification determination
is whether the requirements of FRCP 23 are met—not whether they are
meritorious. 156 While the Dukes Court acknowledged that it is inevitable in some
cases that the FRCP 23 analysis will overlap with the merits of the underlying
claim, “[FRCP] 23 grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits
inquiries at the certification stage.” 157 From a policy standpoint, there is a
critical distinction between refusing to certify consumer class action lawsuits
seeking only monetary damages and rejecting suits against governments
concerning the basic human rights of vulnerable populations. 158 This is
particularly true in cases like Willis where the plaintiffs seek only declaratory or
injunctive relief rather than monetary damages. 159
The arguments for heightened class action standards are more focused on
the cost of litigation than the value of ensuring access to justice for particularly
disadvantaged members of society. 160 As the amicus brief by Disability Rights
Washington points out, “[m]arginalized and vulnerable people are often
without the means and capacity to seek court intervention when their rights are
violated.” 161 If an individual lacks “a permanent address, regular access to
transportation, a safe place to store personal records, and [has] few or no
financial resources,” 162 it is nearly impossible to bring an individual claim
against the government to enjoin the violation of their constitutional rights.
These obstacles are further magnified for unhoused individuals with
“serious mental health or physical disabilities,” 163 who are “particularly likely to
experience unsheltered homelessness.” 164 Even if the defendants in Willis posted
notices of the sweeps in conspicuous areas, these notices would be of no help to
156. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974) (stating that the only question in a
class certification inquiry is whether the requirements of FRCP 23 are met).
157. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 466 (2013).
158. See supra Section III.A for the Dukes court’s discussion of the distinction between these types
of claims in light of FRCP 23. See also Lawrence, supra note 152.
159. Complaint, supra note 3, at 6.
160. See generally Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,”
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 982, 984 (2003) (“Critics maintain that excessive and frivolous litigation overwhelms the
judicial system’s capacity to administer speedy and efficient justice, leads to higher costs for litigants
and society at large, and even hinders America’s competitive position in the global economy.”). Critics
of this view simply wave away this argument by saying that the value of broad access is too difficult or
impossible to quantify. See Lawrence, supra note 152, at 1237–38.
161. Washington et al. Amicus Brief, supra note 6, at 12.
162. Id. at 16.
163. Id. at 2.
164. Id. at 8 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., 2017 CONTINUUM OF CARE HOMELESS
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS HOMELESS POPULATIONS AND SUBPOPULATIONS 1, 2 (2017),
https://www.hudexchange.info/resource/reportmanagement/published/CoC_PopSub_NatlTerrDC_2
017.pdf [https://perma.cc/47LZ-EA9D]).
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individuals who are blind, have cognitive disabilities, suffer from other visual
impairments, or have language barriers. 165 Moreover, some of the items the
defendants seized include “medication, respirators, wheelchairs, [and] canes.” 166
Thus, the defendants’ sweeps threaten not only the legal rights of unhoused
individuals in the City but also their well-being. The government should not
be permitted to “seize and destroy with impunity the worldly possessions of a
vulnerable group in our society.” 167 Likewise, courts should not be complicit by
shutting the courthouse doors to vulnerable populations seeking to fight
systemic injustice and abuse.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs in Willis face challenges on a daily basis that most Americans
never have to think about. Despite—or perhaps because of—their status as
members of a particularly vulnerable population, they were not afforded the
opportunity to use the only vehicle designed to help them fight violations of
their constitutional rights.
Even though the unhoused plaintiffs presented plausible facial challenges
to the Sweep Policies of the City and WSDOT according to the pleading
standards in Iqbal and FRCP 8, the Willis majority waved them aside and
refused to acknowledge them. If the majority had recognized the plaintiffs’
adequate facial challenges, it would have found that the facial challenge satisfied
the FRCP 23 commonality standard.
The Willis majority’s decision rests on indefensible logic and misapplies
FRCP 23 precedent. By refusing to certify the class of unhoused individuals,
the Willis court engaged in legal acrobatics to shut out the claims of “poor,
marginalized, and vulnerable people who are already significantly
disadvantaged in their ability to access justice.” 168 In one fell sweep, their
decision treats homelessness like a crime 169 and punishes those whom FRCP 23
was designed to protect.
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